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Abstract 
This paper presents some theory and evidence on the implications of sudden 
currency depreciations for output and inflation. It identifies some of the 
characteristics shared by countries which have suffered falling output in the 
aftermath of a currency crisis, and it presents a small model which rationalises 
aspects of this common experience. The model is then used to derive the optimal 
monetary policy response to a crisis. A key result is that a currency crisis which 
coincides with a banking crisis is more likely to depress output and may call for an 
accommodating monetary policy. 
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CURRENCY CRISES AND MACROECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 
Luke Gower and Alan Krause 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade or so, events in east Asia, eastern Europe and Latin America 
have invigorated research into sudden currency depreciations. Much of the recent 
interest in depreciations has collected around their proximate causes and their 
short-term policy implications. By contrast, the longer-term effects of sudden 
depreciations have been a relatively minor theme in the literature. This paper 
addresses these longer-term effects. It presents evidence on the effects of currency 
crises in a substantial number of cases over a 34-year period ending in 1998, and it 
offers a simple theoretical framework for exploring the dynamic response of an 
economy to a sudden depreciation of its currency. 
The data show that sudden nominal depreciations occasionally stimulate an 
economy, but more frequently they lead to falls in output. The adverse effects of a 
currency crisis on output turn out to be most pronounced in countries which 
simultaneously have banking crises; which have a greater trade dependency; whose 
exchange rates are naturally volatile; and in countries which are poor. 
The data also identify some of the effects of currency crises on inflation. Firm prior 
expectations of price behaviour are difficult to form. On the one hand, sudden 
depreciations add directly to the cost of imports. But this effect could be at least 
partially, and perhaps more than fully, offset when the depreciation coincides with 
falling aggregate demand. 
For the countries and crises in our sample, the offset turns out to be partial. The 
average inflation rate of most countries is higher in the two years after a crisis than 
it was in the two years preceding. But the increase is not always very great, and in 
a fair proportion of cases – about 30 per cent – average inflation actually fell after 
a crisis. 2 
 
The formal theoretical exercise in the paper rationalises some of these features of 
sudden depreciations, describing the propagation process with a simple monetary 
model, and identifying some of the factors which distinguish benign from malign 
depreciations. The condition of the banking system and the exposure of the 
economy to imported inflation are highlighted in the analysis. 
The model is then used to devise monetary policy rules for crises. It shows that a 
monetary authority which seeks price and output stability is most likely to tighten 
policy in response to a currency crisis when the crisis has not disrupted the 
domestic financial system. In the event of twin banking and currency crises, the 
monetary authority might have to ease policy, unless there is substantial import 
price inflation. The optimal policy is subject to developments in the banking 
system because a twin crisis will tend to produce a much larger rise in the domestic 
interest rate than would a simple increase in the world interest rate. In these 
circumstances, the dampening effects of the higher interest rates on activity can 
overwhelm the stimulus from a depreciated exchange rate. 
The next section of the paper presents data on some of the currency crises that have 
occurred around the world over a 34-year period. Section 3 presents the formal 
modelling and Section 4 concludes with a brief summary of the main results. 
2.  Some Characteristics of Currency Crises 
In this section we present some statistics describing the behaviour of output and 
inflation in the aftermath of a currency crisis. Similar exercises have been 
undertaken by, inter alia, Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Hutchison and 
McDill (1998), and the IMF (1998). The approach in this paper differs from past 
studies mainly in that it has a greater scope, and that it calculates conditional 
probabilities of the output and inflation response to a crisis. 
We consider a sample of 35 developed and developing countries between 1965 and 
1998.1 Following Kraay (2000), we define a currency crisis as a (nominal) 
                                           
1  Our sample is that used by Kraay (2000), although a number of crises have been eliminated 
because of a lack of macroeconomic data needed for our analysis. The countries and timing of 
each crisis are listed in Appendix A. 3 
 
depreciation of the domestic currency against the US dollar of at least 10 per cent 
in one month. We then eliminate any of these depreciations which were not 
preceded by a period of exchange rate stability, defined as an average absolute 
monthly change of less than 2.5 per cent over the past year. This ensures that the 
currency crises identified are sudden, sharp depreciations. Finally, in order to avoid 
the double-counting of single prolonged crises, we eliminate any currency crisis 
which follows a currency crisis within one year. These criteria result in a sample of 
78 currency crises. 
For each country we construct a time series of the output gap, calculated as the log 
of real GDP less a Hodrick-Prescott filter estimate of trend.2 The task then is to 
identify whether each currency crisis had an effect on output. There are a number 
of ways that this might be done. Our approach, which has the advantage of being 
simple, systematic and transparent, is to add a dummy variable representing the 
currency crisis to an autoregressive model of the output gap. If the coefficient on 
the dummy variable is statistically significant (at the 10 per cent level), then we 
conclude that the currency crisis had an effect on output. In order to allow for the 
possibility of some lagged effect of the currency crisis on output, the precise forms 
of the regressions estimated are: 
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for countries with annual GDP data. G represents the output gap and D the dummy 
variable for the currency crisis. The length of the autoregressive process in each 
regression is chosen according to the Akaike criterion. The lag lengths on the 
dummy variable of 4 for the quarterly data regressions and 1 for the annual data 
                                           
2  Following convention, we set the smoothing parameter in the filter equal to 100 (1 600) for 
countries with annual (quarterly) GDP data. 4 
 
regressions are chosen to allow up to a year for the currency crisis to have an 
effect. 
The result of this approach for our sample of countries and currency crises is 
shown in Table 1. Of the 78 currency crises, 23 (or 29 per cent), are estimated to 
have had a significant negative effect on output, 5 per cent a positive effect, and 
65 per cent no discernible effect.3 Confidence intervals at 95 per cent for these 
statistics are also reported. These data suggest that despite boosting external 
competitiveness, sudden depreciations are more likely to have a negative, rather 
than positive, effect on output growth.4 
Table 1: All Currency Crises 
Effect on output 
 Number  Probability 
Output gap    
Negative   23  0.29 
Positive   4  0.05 
No effect    51  0.65 
Total   78   
95 per cent confidence interval     
Negative   0.19–0.40 
Positive   0.00–0.10 
No effect    0.55–0.76 
 
                                           
3   We tested the sensitivity of these results to our definition of a currency crisis by changing the 
‘10 per cent in one month’ rule to ‘20 per cent in three months’. This did not materially alter 
the results. 
4   Although currency crises are defined in terms of nominal depreciations, the short (one month) 
time frame and the presumed stickiness of inflation mean that, in almost all cases, the real 
exchange rate will also depreciate. 5 
 
These conclusions can be refined by considering various partitions of the data. For 
example, Table 2 shows the sub-sample of currency crises which coincided with 
banking crises.5 Of these ‘twin crises’, 47 per cent were associated with a fall in 
output growth (although the sample size is small and the 95 per cent confidence 
interval extends from 25 per cent to 70 per cent), and there are no positive 
outcomes. Table 3 divides the sample into higher-income and lower-income 
countries, based on median per capita income in 1982 (which is the midpoint of 
our sample’s time period). Only 25 per cent of currency crises in higher-income 
countries had a negative effect on output, compared with 33 per cent for 
lower-income countries.6 Since there are as many high-income as low-income 
countries, but a greater number of crises in low-income countries, poor countries 
also appear more likely to suffer a crisis. 
Table 2: Currency Crises with Banking Crises 
Effect on output 
 Number  Probability 
Output gap    
Negative   9  0.47 
Positive   0  0.00 
No effect    10  0.53 
Total   19   
95 per cent confidence interval     
Negative   0.25–0.70 
Positive   na 
No effect    0.30–0.75 
 
                                           
5  The list and dates of banking crises have been compiled from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). Further details 
are provided in Appendix A. 
6   Mean per capita income in our sample of countries is substantially higher than median, 
reflecting the inclusion of a few very rich countries. If mean per capita income is used to 
divide the sample, 14 per cent of currency crises in higher-income countries and 36 per cent in 
lower-income countries had a negative effect on output, reinforcing the results in Table 3. 6 
 
Table 3: Currency Crises by Income 
Effect on output 
 Number  Probability 
Higher-income countries 
Output gap    
Negative 8.5  0.25 
Positive 2.0  0.06 
No effect  24.0  0.70 
Total 34.5   
95 per cent confidence interval    
Negative   0.10–0.39 
Positive   0.00–0.14 
No effect    0.54–0.85 
Lower-income countries 
Output gap    
Negative 14.5  0.33 
Positive 2.0  0.05 
No effect  27.0  0.62 
Total 43.5   
95 per cent confidence interval     
Negative   0.19–0.47 
Positive   0.00–0.11 
No effect    0.48–0.76 
 
The sample is also divided into relatively open and closed countries (based on the 
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in 1982) in Table 4. Unsurprisingly, currency 
crises are more likely to have no effect in relatively closed economies (73 per cent) 
than in open economies (59 per cent). Finally, in Table 5, we split the sample into 
countries with high and low exchange-rate volatility using the standard deviations 
of the monthly changes in the value of their currencies. Those countries whose 
currencies have lower than average volatility are less likely to be adversely 
affected by a currency crisis (20 per cent) than countries whose exchange rates are 
traditionally more volatile (37 per cent). 7 
 
Table 4: Currency Crises by Openness 
Effect on output 
 Number  Probability 
Higher-trade countries 
Output gap    
Negative 13.5  0.33 
Positive 3.5  0.09 
No effect  24.0  0.59 
Total 41.0 
95 per cent confidence interval   
Negative   0.19–0.47 
Positive   0.00–0.17 
No effect    0.43–0.74 
Lower-trade countries 
Output gap    
Negative 9.5  0.26 
Positive 0.5  0.01 
No effect  27.0  0.73 
Total 37.0   
95 per cent confidence interval     
Negative   0.12–0.40 
Positive   0.00–0.05 
No effect    0.59–0.87 
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Table 5: Currency Crises by Exchange Rate Variability 
Effect on output 
  Number Probability 
Higher-volatility countries 
Output gap    
Negative   16  0.37 
Positive   1  0.02 
No effect    26  0.60 
Total   43   
95 per cent confidence interval    
Negative   0.23–0.52 
Positive   0.00–0.07 
No effect    0.46–0.75 
Lower-volatility countries 
Output gap    
Negative   7  0.20 
Positive   3  0.09 
No effect    25  0.71 
Total   35   
95 per cent confidence interval    
Negative   0.07–0.33 
Positive   0.00–0.18 
No effect    0.56–0.86 
 
The finding that currency crises tend to have a negative effect on output in the 
short run is common in the literature (e.g. Bordo and Eichengreen (1999); 
Hutchison and McDill (1998); IMF (1998)), and may be explained in terms of 
income and substitution effects. The income effect of a sudden depreciation, such 
as the increase in interest payable on foreign-currency denominated debt, is 
immediate, whereas the substitution towards domestic goods in response to the 
lower exchange rate may happen with a lag. Unsurprisingly, a country hit by a 
banking crisis as well as a currency crisis is more likely to suffer a contraction in 
output. It is also uncontroversial that exchange rate movements are more likely to 
affect aggregate output in open economies than closed economies. 9 
 
The finding that higher-income countries tend to be less adversely affected by 
currency crises was also expected, for a number of reasons. To begin with, 
higher-income countries tend to have more robust financial and banking systems, 
which are better able to handle shocks. Also, as discussed in Hausmann, Panizza 
and Stein (2000), higher-income countries are more likely to be able to borrow 
abroad in their own currency, suggesting a lower reliance on 
foreign-currency-denominated foreign debt. And finally, lower-income countries 
tend to have higher exchange-rate volatility: 14 of the 17 poorest countries in the 
sample have high exchange-rate volatility on our criteria. 
Turning now to the behaviour of inflation in the aftermath of a currency crisis, 
Figure 1 depicts the changes in inflation that take place after currency crises. The 
horizontal axis measures average year-ended CPI inflation in the two years after a 
currency crisis to the same average in the two years preceding the crisis. So, for 
example, a ratio of two means that average inflation doubled from the two years 
before a crisis to the two years after it. The lack of CPI data for some countries and 
time periods has reduced the sample size from 78 to 59. 
The distribution is clearly positively skewed. The finding that inflation tends to rise 
following a currency crisis is not surprising, although it is of some interest that in 
about 30 per cent of crises, average inflation actually fell. Interestingly, these falls 
were not confined to countries which experienced output contractions. In fact, 
average inflation fell in only 2 of the 15 crises in which the output effect was 
negative. Therefore, at least in our sample, when a currency crisis has an adverse 
effect, both output and inflation tend to deteriorate. 10 
 
Figure 1: Inflation Changes 





























Notes:  The figure shows average inflation in the two years following a crisis, divided by average inflation in the 
two years preceding the crisis. Figures greater than one indicate a rise in inflation. 
Table 6 divides the sample according to income, Table 7 according to openness, 
and Table 8 according to exchange rate variability. Inflation is much more likely to 
rise substantially in lower-income countries after a currency crisis than in 
higher-income countries, and in relatively open economies than closed economies. 
The results of the stable/variable exchange-rate country split are striking. Average 
inflation in countries accustomed to exchange rate stability rose by at least 
50 per cent in only one quarter of all currency crises. The corresponding figure for 
countries more accustomed to exchange rate variability is about 56 per cent. Once 
again, this may be reflecting a correlation between income and exchange rate 
variability. 11 
 
Table 6: Currency Crises by Income 
Post-crisis inflation relative to pre-crisis inflation 
Inflation ratio  Number  Proportion 
Higher-income countries 
<0.5 2.0  0.07 
0.5–0.9 8.0  0.29 
1.0–1.4 9.5  0.35 
1.5–2.0 5.0  0.18 
>2.0 3.0  0.11 
Total 27.5   
Lower-income countries 
<0.5 1.0  0.03 
0.5–0.9 7.0  0.22 
1.0–1.4 7.5  0.24 
1.5–2.0 5.0  0.16 
>2.0 11.0  0.35 
Total 31.5   
 
Table 7: Currency Crises by Openness 
Post-crisis inflation relative to pre-crisis inflation 
Inflation ratio  Number  Proportion 
Higher-trade countries 
<0.5 2.0  0.06 
0.5–0.9 8.0  0.22 
1.0–1.4 8.5  0.24 
1.5–2.0 8.0  0.22 
>2.0 9.5  0.26 
Total 36.0   
Lower-trade countries 
<0.5 1.0  0.04 
0.5–0.9 7.0  0.30 
1.0–1.4 8.5  0.37 
1.5–2.0 2.0  0.09 
>2.0 4.5  0.20 
Total 23.0   
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Table 8: Currency Crises by Exchange Rate Variability 
Post-crisis inflation relative to pre-crisis inflation 
Inflation ratio  Number  Proportion 
Higher-volatility countries 
<0.5   1  0.04 
0.5–0.9   5  0.19 
1.0–1.4   6  0.22 
1.5–2.0   7  0.26 
>2.0   8  0.30 
Total   27   
Lower-volatility countries 
<0.5   2  0.06 
0.5–0.9   12  0.38 
1.0–1.4   10  0.31 
1.5–2.0   3  0.09 
>2.0   5  0.16 
Total   32   
 
Two final hypotheses deserve comment. First, it might be thought that the 
predisposition of lower-income countries to suffer more from currency crises and 
the correlation between income and exchange rate stability may reflect the 
tendency of exchange rates in poor countries to depreciate by more in a crisis. 
Table 9 dispels this idea. It shows the distribution of the 1-month depreciations for 
our sample of currency crises and reveals no significant difference between 
higher-income and lower-income countries. Just under two-thirds of currency 
crises for both groups involved depreciations of 20 per cent or less, although 
depreciations in lower-income countries were a little more likely to be in the 
16–20 per cent band. Depreciations of more than 20 per cent in higher-income and 
lower-income countries are similarly distributed. Therefore, the different output 
and inflation responses to currency crises in higher-income and lower-income 
countries do not appear to be driven by different magnitudes of depreciation. 
Second, there is a common perception that the world has become more ‘crisis 
prone’ in recent years (Bordo and Eichengreen 1999). Table 10, which shows the 
timing distribution of our sample of currency crises, provides just a little support 
for this hypothesis. Apart from a concentration of crises occurring in the early 13 
 
1980s (which is about the midpoint of our sample), the distribution is fairly evenly 
spread, with only a slightly higher proportion of crises occurring after the early 
1980s than before. 
Table 9: Currency Crises by Income 
Size of exchange rate depreciation 
Size Number  Proportion 
Higher-income countries 
10–15 per cent  17.5  0.51 
16–20 per cent  4.0  0.12 
21–30 per cent  3.0  0.09 
31–40 per cent  1.0  0.03 
>40 per cent  9.0  0.26 
Total 34.5   
Lower-income countries 
10–15 per cent  18.5  0.43 
16–20 per cent  9.0  0.21 
21–30 per cent  5.0  0.11 
31–40 per cent  2.0  0.05 
>40 per cent  9.0  0.21 
Total 43.5   
 
Table 10: Timing of Currency Crises 
Timing Number  Proportion 
1965–1970   9  0.12 
1971–1975   9  0.12 
1976–1980   8  0.10 
1981–1985   23  0.29 
1986–1990   11  0.14 
1991–1995   11  0.14 
1996–1998   7  0.09 
Total   78   
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3. The  Model 
3.1  The Basic Model 
This section presents a familiar monetary model which rationalises some of the 
stylised facts about currency crises that were presented in Section 2. It is a simple 
variation on the framework proposed by Buiter and Miller (1982), consisting of an 
LM curve, a Phillips curve, an uncovered interest parity condition, and an IS curve. 
In steady state, domestic prices rise at the same rate as the nominal money supply: 
goods prices are sticky; the nominal exchange rate moves discontinuously in 
response to news;7 the monetary authority controls the rate of nominal money 
supply growth; and market expectations of all endogenous variables are rational. 
The income variable has a steady state value of zero, and so lends itself to 
interpretation as a measure of the output gap. 
Formally, the model’s behavioural equations are: 
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7  The fact that the nominal exchange rate moves between steady states does not preclude the 
possibility that it could have been fixed in the initial steady state. 15 
 
where: 
m = (natural logarithm of) the nominal money stock; 
p = (natural logarithm of) the domestic price level; 
l = (natural logarithm of) real money balances; 
e = (natural logarithm of) the home-currency price of a unit of foreign 
currency; 
c = (natural logarithm of) the real exchange rate; 
y = the output gap; 
r = the domestic nominal bond yield; 
r
* = the foreign nominal and real bond yield (exogenous); 
rd = the rate of interest on domestic money holdings (exogenous); and 
•
= m µ (exogenous). 
These equations are standard in all but two respects. First, the opportunity cost of 
real balances is given, not by the lending rate of interest, but by the difference 
between that rate and the deposit rate of interest, rd. Although this was a feature of 
the original Buiter-Miller model, its implications were not explored at length. It 
will feature prominently in the dynamics described below. 
A more genuine innovation is our modelling of inflation. In the original 
Buiter-Miller model, inflation depends exclusively on the output gap and the rate 
of money supply growth. So, for fixed money supply growth, a nominal exchange 
rate depreciation only boosts inflation because it also stimulates competitiveness 
and output, thus leading to a movement along the short-run Phillips curve. 16 
 
Section 2 suggests that this transmission mechanism does not describe currency 
crises very well, since prices often rise after sudden depreciations, even though 
output may actually fall. The missing element may be the import price inflation 
that follows a sudden depreciation, since this will not necessarily be related to 
output. To capture this, we have assumed that the inflation process is related not 
only to money supply growth and the output gap, but also to the difference 
between the real exchange rate and its equilibrium level; that is, c(t) – γ r*/δ .8 In a 
dynamically stable economy, this aspect of the inflationary process will only be 
temporary. As the real exchange rate converges on its equilibrium level, the shock 
to import prices subsides. 
It seems unlikely that inflation associated with import price pass-through would 
feed through into lower real domestic interest rates. Indeed, as the Asian crisis of 
the late 1990s demonstrates, non-financial corporations typically face sharply 
higher borrowing costs after sudden depreciations, especially if they have 
unhedged liabilities in foreign currency. We capture this rise in the real interest 
rate by modifying the IS equation (Equation (6)), and choosing a value of ϕ  which 
is greater than one. Although this adjustment is ad hoc, it overcomes the otherwise 
implausible prediction of the model that economic activity will necessarily rise as a 
result of the rise in inflation that accompanies a currency crisis. 
We consider two alternative sets of shocks to the model: a simple currency crisis, 
and a twin crisis. A simple crisis happens when the world interest rate rises 
suddenly and unexpectedly, forcing a sharp depreciation. A twin crisis follows 
when the rise in world interest rates and the shock to the currency force banks to 
stem bank runs by raising the deposit rate, rd. 
                                           
8 The  term  δ γ / * r  is the equilibrium real exchange rate, for any values of α  or ϕ . 17 
 
Equations (3) through (8) collapse into the following system of equations: 
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This system is saddlepoint stable if its two characteristic roots are real and of 
opposite sign. For present purposes, this is a necessary property, since only a 
saddlepoint implies the discontinuous jumps in the nominal and real exchange rates 
which characterise currency crises. The condition which gives this saddlepoint 
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A sudden depreciation of the currency is most easily, and plausibly, generated with 
an unexpected rise in the world interest rate. This seems to have precipitated, or at 
least preceded, a number of crises in recent history. The ERM crisis of 1992 and 
some of the Latin American crises of the 1980s are good examples. For present 
purposes, we will assume the increase in the world interest rate to be unanticipated 
and permanent. 
To simulate the banking crises that sometimes coincide with currency crises, 
consider the possibility of a rise in the domestic deposit rate.9 This takes the 
deposit rate above the lending rate and it is both unanticipated and 
contemporaneous with the rise in the world interest rate. It has the effect of making 
                                           
9   We do not model the actual transmission of the currency crisis to the banking crisis. 18 
 
some real balances unavailable for use in either consumption or investment. Of the 
several rationalisations that could support this assumption, we favour the 
possibility that the rise in world interest rates has caused some distress among 
domestic banks and forced them to raise rates on their liabilities in a bid to stem a 
bank run. 
If the banking system is inter-temporally solvent, the deposit rate cannot 
permanently exceed the lending rate. Assume, therefore, that the deposit rate 
increase is of finite but uncertain duration. Specifically, the banking crisis is 
assumed to begin at t = 0, and end at a date T, determined stochastically as the 
outcome of a Poisson process with rate ε . 
As should be clear, the endogenous variables in the model evolve over time along 
deterministic paths. With the arrival of any shock, there will be shifts in these 
deterministic paths at the time of the shock and out into the future. In the case of a 
banking crisis, the only uncertainty in the model once the crisis has begun arises 
from the assumed stochastic nature of the end of the crisis. When the crisis does 
end, the time-paths of the endogenous variables will shift. 
We therefore introduce the notation that, for the endogenous variable x,  x(t) 
follows the deterministic path f(t) while the banking crisis is occurring, for t < T, 
and the path g(t,T) after the crisis has ended, t ≥ T. 
Rather than calculating the details of these deterministic paths, we focus instead on 
the expected value of the endogenous variables formed at the beginning of the 
crisis at t  = 0, E0[x(t)], and examine how this expectation evolves over time 
(as t rises). To calculate E0[x(t)], we integrate over the uncertain end-date of the 
crisis, T: 






− − + =
ε ε ε ε
0
0 ,  (10)   
The analytical solutions for the expected paths are unsightly, and they are best 
explained with the aid of some simple simulations. Table 11 reports a set of 
parameter estimates for this exercise. Although the parameters seem reasonable to 
us, they have been chosen more or less arbitrarily, with the satisfaction of stability 19 
 
conditions in mind. Only two further comments on them seem necessary. First, the 
parameter  ϕ  has been set at a reasonably high level, since at lower levels the 
exchange rate may not overshoot, and at much higher levels, saddlepoint stability 
is threatened. Second, the calibration of the model gives the banking crisis an 
expected duration of five years. 
Table 11: Simulations 
Parameter Value 
κ   1.0 
λ   0.3 
φ   0.1 
α   0.5 and 0.0 
δ   0.2 
ϕ   3.0 
γ   0.8 
µ   0 
ε   0.2 
dr*  0.050 (500 basis points) 
drd  0.075 (750 basis points) and 0.0 
 
Figures 2 to 5 report four sets of simulation results. Figures 2 and 4 show the 
dynamic behaviour of the economy when there are twin banking and currency 
crises, while Figures 3 and 5 show the dynamics when there is no banking crisis 
and hence rd is unchanged. Figures 2 and 3 show the case in which the import price 
effect is operative, while Figures 4 and 5 show the results from the more standard 
case. All results report deviations of the variables from a common baseline of zero.  
A key result is that while the nominal exchange rate depreciates in both cases, 
output only falls when there is a twin crisis.10 A simple increase in the world 
interest rate is expansionary, because it causes the nominal exchange rate to 
depreciate in the short run. However, if there is a banking crisis and the deposit 
rate of interest rises, liquidity will be withdrawn from the system and the nominal 
                                           
10   Since prices are sticky, initial movements in the nominal exchange rate are identical to the 
movements in the real rate. 20 
 
borrowing rate of interest will rise sharply. The simulations show that the 
contractionary effects of this rise can outweigh the stimulus from the exchange 
rate. The inflation outcomes also depend on whether there are simultaneous 
banking and currency crises, but only if there is an import price channel at work. 
Figure 2: Twin Crises 






























































Figures 2 and 3 show that inflation will rise after a shock and that a banking crisis 
will influence the extent of that rise. Figures 4 and 5 show simulations with no 
import price pass-through, and the outcomes are different. Currency crisis 
simulations show the deterministic path of variables after the crisis. Twin crisis 
simulations show the expectation of the variables’ paths formed immediately after 
the crisis (at t = 0). In these simulations, the response of inflation is very modest, 
irrespective of whether or not there has been a banking crisis. 21 
 
Figure 3: Currency Crisis 



































































Figure 4: Twin Crises 
































































Figure 5: Currency Crisis 































































3.2 Optimal  Policy 
After the east Asian currency crisis, there was much debate about the best 
monetary policy response to shocks which induce simultaneous depreciations and 
output contractions. Some have argued that depreciation should not be resisted in 
these circumstances because tighter monetary policy would probably be 
self-defeating (Furman and Stiglitz 1998; Stiglitz 1998). Higher interest rates may 
undermine the banking system and perhaps weaken confidence in the economy to 
the point of perpetuating, rather than easing, the depreciation to which they were 
addressed. Moreover, tighter policy may not be credible in the face of falling 
output, in which case financial markets will certainly discount or ignore it. 
Kraay (2000) documents some general evidence against the effectiveness of tighter 24 
 
policy, showing a striking lack of correlation between interest rate settings and the 
outcome of speculative attacks. 
The more traditional position, as stated by Fischer (1998), is that the damaging 
effects of depreciation on confidence and financial stability can only be arrested if 
the costs of short-selling the currency are raised quickly and sufficiently; that is, if 
monetary policy is tightened. To this, Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) add that inflation 
is a consideration when setting policy in the wake of a crisis. They argue that 
central banks should prefer to see a disequilibrium real depreciation corrected with 
nominal appreciation, rather than inflation. And their evidence suggests that, unless 
the currency crisis coincides with a banking crisis, a nominal appreciation is often 
achieved with tighter monetary policy. 
Our model offers a formal framework which engages both the orthodox and the 
alternative perspectives. Assume that the rate of money growth is set by a 
monetary authority which takes as given the structure of the economy and the 
shocks to r* and rd. Faced with these shocks, it implements the change in the 
money growth rate which minimises a loss function that punishes output gaps and 
non-zero inflation. For the sake of simplicity, this adjustment to the money growth 
rate is assumed to be once-off and permanent. The problem then reduces to: 
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where  υ  and θ  are preference parameters describing the discount rate and the 
weight that the monetary authority places on output deviations. 
To solve this problem, remove the expected rate of inflation using the Phillips 
curve. Then assume that any change to the monetary policy rule which the shock 
might induce is contemporaneous with, and as unanticipated as, the changes in the 
two exogenous interest rates. Speculators are assumed to treat the policy change as 25 
 
credible and permanent, since it represents a solution to a well-defined social 
welfare problem. Consistency between the policy itself and market expectations of 
it makes both private and public behaviour optimal. 
Figures 6 through 8 show the optimal policy response (that is, the optimal choice 
of the money growth rate, µ ) to currency and twin crises, using the parameter 
values in Table 11. The effects of varying θ , υ  and ε  on the optimal choice of µ  are 
highlighted. In most cases, it is optimal to tighten in response to either set of 
shocks. However, if the monetary authority has a high discount rate, or if the 
banking crisis threatens to be very protracted, then the present value of lost output 
is high and so it can be optimal to increase the money growth rate, that is, to ease 
monetary policy. 
Figure 6: Optimal Policy 
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Figure 7: Optimal Policy 
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A final set of simulations highlights the sensitivity of these policy prescriptions to 
the differentials between the exogenous interest rates and to import price inflation. 
The twin crisis case assumes a 1 500 basis point increase in rd and no direct import 
price inflation. The simple currency crisis case assumes a 500 basis point increase 
in r*. 
The optimal policies for these cases are profiled in Figure 9. They show that 
monetary policy depends quite heavily on the behaviour of the banking system – 
an easing is likely to be appropriate during a twin crisis, but unwarranted when 
only the world interest rate rises. In the twin crisis case, the opening of a large 
differential between the two domestic interest rates tends to push output down 28 
 
heavily, while a subdued inflation response removes any incentive which the 
monetary authority may otherwise have had to tighten. 
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These final results accord reasonably well with the conclusions of Aghion, 
Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000). Using a model which is simpler than, but broadly 
similar to, ours, Aghion et al find that it may well be optimal to ease policy when 
the financial system is distressed by the crisis, and when the proportion of foreign 
currency denominated corporate debt is high. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed international evidence on the effects of sudden nominal 
depreciations, and it has presented a framework for considering macroeconomic 29 
 
dynamics in the wake of a currency crisis. In many of the crises in our sample, 
output fell in response to a sudden depreciation, while the inflation response was 
mixed. Both the data and the formal modelling drew attention to the role of 
banking crises in these situations. 
The model has several implications for policy. Formally, it showed that the optimal 
monetary policy response to a crisis depends upon the condition of the banking 
sector. Currency crises that cause, or coincide with, banking crises are different to 
those which are characterised by a simple opening of the international interest 
differential. Because twin crises are more likely to produce interest rate rises which 
overshadow the improved competitiveness that would normally flow from a 
depreciated exchange rate, they can produce declines in output. 30 
 
Appendix A: Sample of Currency and Twin Crises 
Table A1: Higher-income Countries 
Above median per capita income at 1982 sample midpoint 
Country Crises 
Argentina  1966:M11; 1970:M6; 1975:M1; 1981:M2* 
Australia  1974:M10; 1976:M12; 1985:M2 
Bulgaria 1996:M5* 
Colombia 1965:M9 




Israel 1974:M11;  1977:M11*;  1989:M1 
Mexico 1982:M2*;  1994:M12* 
Portugal 1982:M6 
Spain 1977:M7* 
Sweden 1982:M10;  1992:M11* 
Trinidad and Tobago  1985:M12; 1993:M4 
United Kingdom  1967:M12; 1992:M10 
Uruguay 1971:M12;  1982:M12* 
Venezuela  1984:M2; 1986:M12; 1989:M3; 1995:M12* 
South Africa  1975:M10; 1984:M7 
Note:  * denotes twin crises 
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Table A2: Lower-income Countries 
Below median per capita income at 1982 sample midpoint 
Country Crises 
Bolivia  1972:M11; 1979:M12; 1982:M2 
Botswana  1984:M7; 1992:M7; 1998:M7 
Costa Rica  1981:M1 
Dominican Republic  1985:M1; 1987:M6; 1990:M4 
Ecuador  1970:M8; 1982:M5*; 1985:M12; 1992:M9 
Guatemala  1986:M6; 1989:M11; 1997:M1 
Hungary 1991:M1* 
Indonesia  1978:M11; 1983:M4; 1986:M9; 1997:M8* 
Jamaica  1967:M12; 1973:M1; 1978:M5; 1983:M11 
South Korea  1971:M7; 1974:M12; 1980:M1; 1997:M11* 
Mauritius  1967:M12; 1979:M11; 1981:M10 
Peru 1987:M11 
Philippines 1983:M10*;  1997:M9 
Poland 1991:M6* 
Paraguay  1984:M3; 1986:M12; 1989:M3 
Thailand 1984:M11*;  1997:M7* 
Turkey 1991:M3* 
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